The authors examine a program that involves parents directly in the management
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Introduction
Improving school performance, especially in poor communities, remains a challenge facing most countries (Filmer et al 2006) . One policy being examined by many developing countries is school based-management (SBM), which decentralizes responsibility and decision-making powers to local school management committees (World Bank 2007) . 1 SBM takes on many different forms, both in terms of who has the power to make decisions as well as the degree of decision-making. While some programs transfer authority to principals or teachers only, others mandate parental and community participation. SBM devolves authority over one or more of the following: budget allocation, employment and remuneration of teachers and staff, curriculum development, textbook and educational material procurement, infrastructure improvement, school calendar, and monitoring and evaluation of teacher and student performance.
One of the primary reasons proponents support SBM is that decentralizing decision-making to the local level is thought to bring decision-making closer to the people so that their preferences can be better reflected in policy (Oates 1972; Lockwood 2002; Coate 2003 and Ghatak 2003) . The argument is that local decision-makers are better able to adapt the appropriate mix of inputs and education policies to local preferences, realities, and needs; and are more accountable to their constituencies. However, decentralized decision-making policies such as SBM may not improve school quality (Galiani et al 2008) , when parents lack the ability to make their voices heard, when local elites can capture public resources Mookherjee 2005, 2006) , or when SBM groups are less technically able than higher levels of government to administer schools (Smith 1985) .
In this paper, we empirically examine a program that includes parents in school management in a limited way. Parents, especially of younger children, are the principal clients of schools. They represent the interests of their children and, therefore, have the most to gain from better school performance. Participation in management committees provides parents a mechanism for them to assert their preferences over the school's operational decisions and policies, and make schools more accountable. School Management or AGE (Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar). AGE provides small monetary grants to parent associations that they can use to invest in infrastructure or in materials they deem important for their schools. Parents also receive training in the management of these funds and in participatory skills to increase their involvement in school activities. Through AGE parents spend more time in the school as well as regular interaction and greater standing with school directors and teachers. As a result, they are better able to monitor the school activities (teacher absenteeism, children attention in class, etc) and to voice their opinions on school matters. AGE was the first program that gave parents any authority over school matters in Mexico. 3 By 2005 more than 46 percent of primary schools in Mexico had an AGE.
We examine whether increased parental participation through AGE helped to create a more conducive learning environment and thereby improved students' learning outcomes. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the AGE intervention in greater detail. In Section 3, we posit the pathways whereby AGE might affect parental participation using descriptive information from the qualitative interviews. In Section 4 we discuss the identification strategy and data used and present the quantitative empirical results. A discussion of potential biases is provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
4 Summers and Johnson (1996) review the evidence on the effects of SBM in the United States. 5 See for example the works of Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 2003) on El Salvador's EDUCO; DiGropello and Marshall (2005) on the effects of the Hondura's PROHECO program; King and Ozler (1998) , King et al (1999) and Parker (2005) for kids studying and monitoring that the homework was done. Another 42 percent of the principals reported that parents increased going to school to talk to teachers and followed up on their kids learning.
Both parents and principal reported that AGE increased parental participation in school, made parents more demanding in terms of attention to their children's learning needs and teacher effort, and increased parental involvement with homework. In the following section we test whether AGE improved intermediate schooling outcomes and provide an estimate of the size of the impact.
Did AGE Reduce Grade Repetition, Grade Failure, and Drop out?
We estimate the effects of AGE on three educational outcomes: the probability that the student fails an exam, repeats a grade or drops out of school. 
Estimation and Identification
In principle, we would like to compare school performance when schools have an AGE to the counterfactual -i.e. quality for the same schools without an AGE at the same time. Since the counterfactual is never observed and we do not have a controlled randomized trial, we are forced to turn to quasi-experimental methods that mimic the counterfactual under reasonable conditions.
We propose to use the phased rollout of the AGE to identify treatment and comparison groups, with the treatment group being schools getting AGE early and the comparison group being those who got AGE later. A major concern is that the late adopters could be different from the early adopters, and that these differences may be correlated with school performance. For example, the schools that received AGE early could be located in poorer rural areas while the ones that received it later could be in wealthier areas. In this case, the correlation between AGE and performance could be confounded with the wealth effect. Alternatively, it could be that schools with the strongest potential for improvement -schools with more engaged parents and motivated school staff -were incorporated at earlier stages. If so, our estimate of treatment would overestimate the true effect of the program.
In principle, many of the types of (unobservable) characteristics that may confound identification vary across schools, but are fixed over time. A common method of controlling for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity is to use panel data and estimate difference in differences models. We use this identification strategy, and hence, compare the change in outcomes in the treatment group to the change in outcomes in the comparison group. By comparing changes, we control for observed and unobserved time- Formally, we estimate the following regression specification of the difference in difference model for all t =1997-2001:
where:
• Y st is the proportion of school s's students who fail an exam, repeat a grade or drop out in year t; 10 We take school year 1997-98 as the baseline year. Evaluation years are from 1998-99 to 2001-02.
• AGE s,t-1 = 1 if school s had an AGE just before the start at t-1 -or early in the school year -of school year t; is the school average of individual error terms, which includes unobserved individual characteristics such as learning ability or disutility from studying. For the time being, we assume unobservables uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
We compute robust standard errors clustered at the school level to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The coefficient is the difference in difference estimate of the effect of the presence of AGE in the school on the outcome of interest. The specification in (1) 1 β 11 We have replaced missing values for school characteristics with the municipality average in the school year (or the state average in its default). We have included indicator variables to account for the replacement.
assumes that the AGE require at least a full school year to be effective. In a second specification, we decompose the AGE s,t-1 dummy in a set of dummies that equal one if the school has had AGE for one year and a second if the school has had AGE for two or more years. This addresses the question of whether the AGE impact on outcomes cumulates over time.
Treatment and Comparison Groups
As argued earlier, we exploit the geographic expansion of AGE over time to construct treatment and comparison groups. Table 1 shows summary statistics for a few school observable characteristics and for the dependent variables in 1997 (baseline) for AGE treatment and comparison 12 We limit on the sample to rural non-indigenous primary schools because the vast majority of AGE beneficiary schools are in rural areas and all indigenous schools were automatically incorporated when AGE first started in 1998 in these States. 13 Because we only have AGE coverage data until 2003, we do not know whether schools in the comparison group received AGE at later dates. 14 To allow comparison across outcomes, we restrict the sample to schools with complete information on outcomes. Results are robust to the inclusion of schools with missing information for one or more of the outcomes. We also drop from the sample schools with extremely high numbers of students and/or teachers (top 0.5 percent of each distribution and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of students). We have also trimmed schools with values of the dependent variables in the top 0.5% of each distribution.
schools. AGE treatment schools are significantly smaller on average: they have fewer students, teachers, and classrooms. However, treatment schools also seem to have similar learning outcomes prior to the intervention. Average grade failure at baseline is 10.0 percent in treatment schools versus 9.9 in comparison schools. Similarly, baseline grade repetition is 9.5 percent in treatment schools versus 9.1 percent in comparison schools, and the drop out rate is 3.8 percent in treatments versus 4.2 in comparisons. While some of these differences are statistically significant, the order of magnitude of the differences is small. The fact that we find no significant effects of AGE on intra-year drop out rates is not too surprising. Enrolment and completion rates at the primary school level in Mexico are very high -at over 96 percent -hence leaving little scope for improvement. As a result, the drop out is about 60 percent lower than the failure and repetition repetition rates. In addition, students in Oportunidades families need to be enrolled to obtain the cash benefit. We further discuss this issue later.
Average Treatment Effects
Threats to Identification
The use of difference in differences controls for observed and unobserved timeinvariant school characteristics as well as time-varying factors common to both comparison and treatment schools that might be simultaneously correlated with AGE and with indicators of performance. However, the introduction of treatment in a school might respond to or be correlated with other time varying factors, such as political will, other educational interventions, sorting of students or parental pressure. If these factors also affect outcomes, then our estimates of impact will be biased. In the next subsections, we address each of these potential biases separately. We first test the validity of the key identification assumption of difference in difference models: the equality in the evolution of the outcome variables prior to the intervention.
Testing for Balance in Pre-Interventions Trends
We present two tests of the equality of pre-intervention trends of the outcomes of Hence, we first estimate the following specification on pre-intervention data, i.e.
for all t' =1995-1997: • YR t' are yearly dummy variables for all school years in the pre-intervention period;
• POTAGE s is a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if school s is a potential treatment school; this is to say, if s will receive AGE for some or all of the treatment years (t =1998-2001);
• u st' is an heteroskedastic disturbance that allows for correlation within schools over time.
In this specification, the test δ t' =0 is equivalent to the test of the equality of the preintervention trends between treatment and comparison schools at each time t'.
In a second specification, we test the equality in pre-intervention trends between comparison schools and schools that entered the program in different years. In this case, the equation to estimate for all t' =1995-1997 is:
where INAGE sj is a set of dummies that take on the value 1 if the school s started benefiting from the AGE intervention on year j= 1998,…, 2001. Thus, the coefficients on the interaction with the year dummies, the λ t' 's, capture differences in pre-intervention trends for schools entering the AGE scheme at different years. Table 3 reports the test of the difference in pre-intervention trends for the outcomes of interest: grade failure, grade repetition and intra-year drop out. For each dependent variable (reported in columns), the first column (Models A) corresponds to the estimation of specification (2) and the second column (Models B) to the estimation of (3).
All specifications include school and time fixed effects and state-time specific trends. As Model A estimates show, there are no significant differences in pre-intervention trends between treatment and comparison schools in any of the outcomes. Similarly, Model B estimates suggest that comparison schools are fairly similar to treatment schools that were phased-in into the AGE scheme at different years. Only one of the 30 estimated coefficients on the interaction terms comes up as significant at standard significance levels.
Endogenous Program Placement Bias
Program placement biases might arise if the state authority decided to allocate programs non-randomly in response to political considerations. For instance, the state government could assign benefits to more disadvantaged schools first given budget constraints. In this case, estimates would be downward biased. Alternatively, the state government could prioritize better performing schools in order to maximize the chances of success and improve its reputation as a good manager. Now, estimates would likely overestimate the true program impact. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 , the characteristics of treatment and comparison schools are sufficiently different as to raise such concern. In addition, we know that the state authority had certain discretion over the type and timing of benefits that targeted beneficiary schools would receive. 15 We argue that the inclusion of school fixed effects controls for any time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity across schools. Moreover, the balance in outcome pre-intervention trends between treatment and comparison schools -shown in the previous subsection -rules out any changes in school characteristics that are not a direct consequence of the schools' acquired treatment status. Finally, the inclusion of separate state specific time dummies should capture any aggregate state time effects that might be correlated with the allocation of treatment (shifts in government tastes, for instance) or with outcomes (changes in enrolment due to changes state demographics), and further minimizes the potential for this bias.
Presence of Other Educational Interventions in the School
An additional concern is whether part of the observed effects are driven by other policies also directed to improve schooling quality and accessibility that are simultaneously operating in the school. As noted, the inclusion of state specific time dummies captures any possible change in the allocation of resources to education within states over time. To absorb any remaining bias, we additionally include explicit controls for three other educational interventions. Because these programs are likely to be endogenous, interpretation of the estimated effects on the outcomes of interest must be looked at with some reservation.
They are also highly correlated with the presence of AGE in the school, as Tables 1 and 2 show. Nonetheless, their inclusion in the regression will provide additional evidence on the robustness of the effect of AGE if they do not substantially alter the value of the estimate of impact. Table 4 presents results. For each dependent variable, Models A1 and C1 are analogous to those in Table 2 but further introduce the proportion of Oportunidades beneficiaries and teachers in Carrera Magisterial in the school. The estimated effects of AGE on repetition and failure fall slightly after the inclusion of these covariates in the estimation (Model A1, Table 4), but remain significantly different form zero. There still is no estimated impact on drop out. In Models A2 and C2 we additionally control for all other interventions supported by the Compensatory Program. Including these extra variables does not further change the size of the estimated effect.
Concerning the effect of these covariates on outcomes, we observe that the proportion of teachers under Carrera Magisterial and proportion of Oportunidades beneficiary students in the school significantly reduces repetition and failure. The later effect might be due to the fact that the Oportunidades scholarships increase with the grade of enrolment, and are conditional on attendance as well as on not repeating more than twice a grade. Oportunidades may also impact learning outcomes through the improved nutrition and health practices it enforces (reduced morbidity). This is consistent with the growing literature that establishes strong positive effects of health on school performance (Miguel and Kremer 2004; Bobonis et al 2006) . Lastly, the other Compensatory program sub-interventions seem to have no impact.
Changes in the Distribution of Students in the School
The error term st ε in (1) includes unobserved student characteristics, = ist θ {skills, ability, motivation}, that we have so far assumed uncorrelated with the observed treatment variables. However, treatment might affect the skill mix of students enrolling in school. For instance, AGE schools might attract higher skill or more motivated students whose parents have a higher preference for education. Alternatively, AGE might enable schools to retain lower skill students who were not doing well academically and would otherwise have withdrawn. If these changes in total enrollment significantly alter the distribution of students' skills in the school, then the treatment would be correlated with unobserved ability and the estimated effect biased.
Although it is difficult to determine the direction of the bias, we can nonetheless test for its existence by examining changes in enrollment in response to AGE. In Table 5, we estimate (1) on total enrolment to test whether there is any significant difference in the evolution of enrolment between treatment and comparison schools. We find no effect of AGE on total enrollment. We therefore believe that changes in the distribution of student skills are unlikely to account for the observed effects in failure and repetition rates.
Student Learning vs. Parental Pressure
Finally, we examine whether the effects observed on schooling outcomes are indeed the result of teachers influencing results in response to increased parental pressure. While, we cannot test this hypothesis with the administrative data available, we did ask principals about this possibility in the May 2006 survey interviews. 17 More specifically, we asked principals about parents' reactions to the possibility of their children repeating a year or receiving a very poor grade. Less than 3 percent of principals reported that parents demanded that undeserving children be allowed to progress.
According to principals, the vast majority of parents (97 percent) accepted that their child was failing or that they received a poor grade. Hence, although AGE makes parents more demanding in terms of teacher attendance and attention to children's learning needs, they do not seem to make them pressure teachers to change grades for undeserving students.
Conclusions
Mexico's AGE aims to empower parent associations to improve school quality.
We have provided quantitative empirical evidence that AGE improved intermediate school outcomes, namely reducing grade repetition and grade failure by 4 to 5 percent.
These results are important as Manacorda (2007) and Marshall (2003) show that repetition and failure are associated with poor test performance and a higher probability of subsequent drop out. However, a limitation of the study is that we only have crude measures of school performance, rather than more sensitive measures such as test scores.
Our qualitative results suggest that the pathways by which AGE improved performance were through increased parental participation in school matters, and improved relations and communication between parents and teachers. Parents in schools with AGE were more likely to observe and complain about teacher absence and poor teaching. And they were more likely to know when their child was not doing well and take corrective action.
These results are consistent with theories laid out in the economics of identity and social exclusion (Akerlof and Kranton, 200 and 2005) . This work postulates that one's identity enters the utility function of both the parent and the school director. Social exclusion occurs when both believe that the parent does not deserve the benefit. The AGE acts to change parental identity and gives them a seat at the table. Indeed, the lack of formal role for parents in the Argentine decentralization of schools may explain why Galiani et al (2008) found positive effects in wealthy communities, but no impact on schools in poorer communities.
Finally, the results have important policy implications. Empowering parents in SBM is likely to strengthen the positive effects of decentralization. However, while the quantitative effects of AGE are strong and consistent, there are albeit modest. The relative small size of the effects should not come as a surprise given that AGE is a very limited intervention. Interventions that greatly increase the power of parents could be considered and tested. 
APPENDIX: TABLES
School Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y State by Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Time-Varying School Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Treatment Specific Trend N Y N N Y N N Y N Prob > F-stat Joint Significance (1) = (2) = 0 - - 0.00 - - 0.00 - - 0.98 Prob > F-stat (1) = (2) - - 0.71 - - 0.40 - - 0
DROP OUT RATE
Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the school level in parantheses. Time-varying school characteristics include the proportion of students per teacher (student teacher ratio) and the proportion of students per class (class crowding index). Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the school level in parantheses. Time-varying school characteristics include the proportion of students per teacher (student teacher ratio) and the proportion of students per class (class crowding index). 
FAILURE RATE REPETITION RATE
FAILURE RATE
TOTAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT
Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the school level in parantheses. 
